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Abstract
The paper proposes a stylized intertemporal macroeconomic model wherein the combination of
decentralized trading and microeconomic uncertainty (taking the form of privately observed and
uninsured idiosyncratic shocks) creates an information problem between agents and generates
indeterminacy of the macroeconomic equilibrium. For a given value of the economic fundamen-
tals, the economy admits a continuum of equilibria that can be indexed by the sales expectations
of firms at the time of investment. The Walrasian allocation is one of these possible equilibria
but it is reached only if firms are optimistic enough. With a weaker degree of optimism, equi-
librium output, employment and real wages will be lower than in the Walrasian equilibrium.
Moreover, the range of possible equilibria will depend positively on the wage elasticity of the
labour supply and on the magnitude of the information problem between buyers and sellers (in
our case, the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks).
Stochastic simulations performed on a calibrated version of the model show that pure demand
expectation shocks may generate business cycle statistics that are not inconsistent with the
observed ones.
Keywords: indeterminacy, non-Walrasian economy, business cycle, animal spirits, continuum of
equilibria
JEL classification: E10, E24
1 Introduction
Business cycle analysts often associate the success or failure of an economic recovery to investors
and/or consumers expectations and degree of confidence. Obviously enough, subjective confi-
dence effects cannot be discussed in standard Walrasian setups wherein the knowledge of the
economy’s “fundamentals” typically suffices to determine a unique equilibrium (trajectory). As
is well-known, the macroeconomic outcome may be affected by “animal spirits” only if there are
market imperfections. Various contributions to the business cycle literature have outlined that
technological externalities and complementarities, imperfect competition and increasing returns
may each cause equilibrium indeterminacy and lead to economic fluctuations purely driven by
agents’ expectations1. Our paper will stress that the very working of a decentralized (competi-
tive) economy, in the absence of a market mechanism comparable to the Walrasian auctioneer,
is sufficient to explain that the equilibrium may depend not only on economic fundamentals but
also on agents’ expectations. In an intertemporal setup, the paper illustrates how decentralised
trading may lead to equilibrium indeterminacy when agents have to make decisions that will
commit them on a market (at least temporarily) while they are imperfectly informed about their
trading opportunities.
The simplest example is a productive capacity choice by a firm that is still uncertain about
future purchase orders. In a Walrasian setup, the very question of this uncertainty is almost
incongruous: for a firm, uncertainty about future market conditions concerns future output
price and not sales volume. When investing, a Walrasian firm indeed knows that at the time of
exchange it will be able to realise all (ex post) profitable transactions at the market price vector.
In a decentralized market where there is no device that always guarantees full information about
the existing trading opportunities between buyers and sellers, a firm may end up with some idle
productive capacity if ex post it receives too few purchase orders in comparison to its optimal
productive capacity; it may leave some orders unfilled in the opposite case. Expectations about
forthcoming orders then affect the firm’s investment decision and thereby the actual level of
transactions, low activity levels resulting from low investments due to pessimistic expectations.
1See Farmer and Benhabib (1999) for a survey of business cycle models with such types of imperfections and
Schmitt-Grohe (1997) for a comparative study of their quantitative implications.
Our objective is to formalise these intuitions in a model that departs as little as possible from a
standard Walrasian intertemporal macroeconomic model. The model economy consists of four
competitive markets (labour, capital, final good and intermediate goods) and only differs from
a Walrasian model in the working of the intermediate goods market. On that market, an infor-
mation problem between buyers and sellers2 exists because intermediate firms experience purely
idiosyncratic technological shocks that are uninsured and only privately observed. These shocks
imply heterogeneous employment and production decisions at the prevailing competitive prices
and wages. In a Walrasian world, those shocks would be inconsequential at the aggregate econ-
omy level: ex post, final firms would always buy a quantity of intermediate goods such that every
intermediate firm sells its optimal production level. This could occur (in the case of centralized
trading but also) in the case of decentralized trading if final firms received all the relevant in-
formation about every intermediate firm’s situation and sent purchase orders accordingly. We
depart slightly from this scenario by analysing the case where final firms send purchase orders to
intermediate firms without knowing every intermediate firm’s optimal production level3. At the
competitive price, an intermediate firm enjoying a good productivity shock may then receive too
few purchase orders, and vice-versa. The possibility of such outcomes makes the intermediate
firm’s investment choice depend on expected forthcoming purchase orders. These expectation
effects are shown to induce indeterminacy of the macroeconomic equilibrium (even with full
employment of a fixed labour supply): the economy possesses a continuum of equilibria that can
be indexed by the demand expectations of the intermediate firms. The Walrasian allocation4
is one of these possible equilibria but it is reached only if firms are optimistic enough. With a
2In a decentralized economy, what an agent has to anticipate includes the anticipations and behaviours of the
other agents. There will be no such sophistications in the present model that will deal with these coordination
problems in a highly stylized way.
3The assumption that idiosyncratic technological shocks are at the root of the information problem between
buyers and sellers should not be interpreted too literally. The existence of an uninsured microeconomic risk is a
key ingredient of our model but the assumption that it bears on productivity is only made for convenience. We
present in Appendix 2 an alternative version of our model where idiosyncratic productivity shocks are substituted
for idiosyncratic demand shocks: it is shown to have the same properties as in the model of the main text.
4In the present model with an idiosyncratic risk for input firms, we call Walrasian the equilibrium in which all
agents fulfill their Walrasian transaction plans at the market prices and wages: in particular, each intermediate
firms sells its profitable output level conditionally on the microeconomic shock it has experienced.
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weaker degree of optimism, equilibrium output, employment and real wages will be lower than
in the Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, the range of possible equilibria will depend on the mag-
nitude of the information problem between buyers and sellers i.e. here, on the variance of the
idiosyncratic shocks. Once there is no microeconomic shock, there is no informational problem
between agents and the decentralized economy reaches a unique equilibrium, equivalent to the
Walrasian outcome.
The idea that equilibrium indeterminacy may follow from the coordination difficulties raised by
the very working of a decentralized market is not new. Several theoretical contributions on the
subject have been developed independently from (and even before) the stochastic business cy-
cle models with indeterminacy due to imperfect competition, increasing returns or externalities.
Among others, Diamond (1982) stresses the effects of decentralised trading in an economy where
the Walrasian auctioneer is replaced by a stochastic matching process; Bryant (1983) emphasises
coordination problems in a stylised model with complementary intermediate goods and decen-
tralised decision-making; in a non-cooperative game framework, Roberts (1987, 1989) shows
that non-Walrasian market institutions regarding price and quantity determination may imply
multiple equilibria in which prices and wages are set at their Walrasian levels while quantities
vary down from their Walrasian level to zero. Our model (which emphazises the role of imperfect
information in a decentralized exchange process) shares a same basic intuition with the above
mentioned papers even though it models the interactions between agents in an incomparably less
sophisticated way than in Roberts’ or in market games. But advantageously, the simplicity of
our formulation will allow us to explore its quantitative implications in a stochastic/calibrated
business cycle exercice.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the behaviours of agents;
it presents the equilibrium conditions and discusses the result of equilibrium indeterminacy,
first under a general technological assumption, next under the assumption of a Cobb Douglas
production function. In section 3, stochastic simulations performed on a calibrated version of
the model show that pure demand expectation shocks may generate business cycle statistics
that are not inconsistent with the observed ones. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Economy
We consider an economy where the production of the final good requires two stages. Intermediate
good firms use labour and capital to produce an homogeneous good that is the sole input of
final goods firms. Both types of firms operate under perfect competition. Intermediate firms
experience idiosyncratic technological shocks. These shocks imply heterogeneous employment
and production decisions at the competitive prices and wages. We assume a decentralised trading
process where final firms have to send purchase orders without full information about the shocks
that hit the different input suppliers. An intermediate firm may then run some idle capacities
since the orders it receives may fall short of its Walrasian output level.
Since a final goods firm cannot distinguish among intermediate goods producers, it sends the
same purchase orders qdt to all input firms. We further assume that all input firms expect the
same purchase orders. This simplification makes all input firms identical before the realization
of the idiosyncratic shocks.
2.1 Behaviours
Intermediate Goods Producers
We assume a continuum of ex ante identical firms, uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
In each firm, factor productivity is random. With kt units of capital and `t units of labour, a
firm produces a quantity of output qt given by:
qt = f(kt, `t, θt),
where θt ∈ [θmin, θmax] , with 0 ≤ θmin < θmax <∞ .
(1)
θt is a firm specific productivity shock with distribution function G(θ). f is concave and in-
creasing (fk, f` > 0, fkk, f`` < 0 and fk` > 0), with non-increasing returns to scale. Every firm
takes the intermediate goods price pt, the wage rate wt and the interest rate rt as given (the
final good serves as nume´raire).
We assume the following sequence of events and decisions. At the beginning of period t, each
intermediate goods producer decides the value of the productive capital stock kt before observing
4
the factor productivity shock θt, and given expectations about output demand qdt , the interme-
diate goods price pt and the wage rate wt. The employment and production decisions of period
t are taken later, once the realized value of θt has been observed by the intermediate firm. We
analyse this sequence of decisions backwards, starting with employment at given capital stock.
Optimal labour demand
Let us first consider the case of an intermediate goods firm that receives a sufficient quantity of
orders and is not sales-constrained. Given a predetermined capital stock kt and a realized value
of the shock θt, the employment decision in period t is then the solution of a standard Walrasian
optimization programme:
max
`t
pt f(kt, `t, θt) − wt `t.
The optimal employment level `wt must be such that f`(kt, `
w
t , θt) = wt/pt. This implies:
`wt = `(kt, ωt, θt) and q
w
t = q(kt, ωt, θt) , (2)
where ωt is the period t real wage for an intermediate good firm (i.e., ωt = wt/pt) and qwt is
the corresponding profitable output. Functions ` and q are increasing in both kt and θt and
decreasing in ωt. Let us denote Πwt the operating surplus corresponding to these employment
and output levels:
Πwt = ptΠ
w(kt, ωt, θt) where Πw(kt, ωt, θt) = qwt − ωt `wt . (3)
Under our assumptions on f , function Πw is concave in kt and decreasing in ωt.
We now turn to the case of an intermediate goods firm receiving a quantity of orders smaller
than the profitable productive capacity qwt . The demand for labour then coincides with the
employment level `dt necessary to produce q
d
t , i.e.,
5 such that f(kt, `dt , θt) = q
d
t , or,
`dt = `
d(kt, qdt , θt), (4)
5Note that we could introduce the possibility of stocking the unsold production. This would not change our
results qualitatively. Indeed, inventories cannot provide full insurance and cannot eliminate the problem at the
origin of the equilibrium indeterminacy. Inventories would have two types of effect. On the one hand, inventories
would change the supply capacity of the firms: a firm could now sell qwt plus inventories. But qualitatively,
this would not change anything to the fact that a firm that would receive more orders than its supply capacity
(whatever it is qwt + inventories or simply q
w
t ) would be capacity constrained. On the other hand, if the firm
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where function `d is increasing in qdt and decreasing in the other two arguments. Let us denote
Πdt the operating surplus of a sales-constrained firm, that is:
Πdt = ptΠ
d
(
kt, q
d
t , ωt, θt
)
where Πd
(
kt, q
d
t , ωt, θt
)
= qdt − ωt `dt (5)
Given our assumptions on f , function Πd is easily shown to be increasing in qdt and kt, decreasing
in ωt.
As all intermediate goods firms receive the same quantity of orders qdt , a given firm will be
sales-constrained only in the case where it experiences a productivity shock θt sufficiently high
to imply qwt = q(kt, ωt, θt) > q
d
t . Let us denote by θ¯t the critical value of the productivity shock
such that the corresponding Walrasian production plan matches exactly the quantity of orders
received by a firm:
θ¯t : q(kt, ωt, θ¯t) = qdt . (6)
If θt is larger (resp. smaller) than θ¯t, the firm is (resp. is not) sales-constrained.
Optimal capital stock
The capital stock is chosen before the realized value of the shock is known to the producer. The
optimal choice takes into account the fact that depending on the realized value of the shock, the
firm may turn out to be sales-constrained (if θ lies in between θ¯ and θmax). Expected profits
maximization can thus be written as follows:
max
kt
∫ θ¯t
θmin
pt Πw (kt, ωt, θ) dG(θ) +
∫ θmax
θ¯t
pt Πd
(
kt, q
d
t , ωt, θ
)
dG(θ) − (rt + δ) kt. (7)
The capital stock kt is determined by the following first-order optimality condition:
rt + δ
pt
=
∫ θ¯t
θmin
Πwk (kt, ωt, θ) dG(θ) +
∫ θmax
θ¯t
Πdk
(
kt, q
d
t , ωt, θ
)
dG(θ) , (8)
where function Πwk (resp. Π
d
k) represents the first partial derivative of function Π
w (resp. Πd)
with respect to k. The first term on the right-hand side of (8) is the expected marginal revenue of
capital when productivity is low; it is decreasing in kt under the assumption of strictly decreasing
received less orders, it could obviously choose to produce more than sales and so reduce the effect of the sales
contraint. But a firm that has already accumulated large inventories and faces a severe sales constraint is unlikely
to produce at full capacity, even if the inventory cost is limited to the financial capital cost.
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returns to scale. The second term on the right-hand side of (8) represents the expected marginal
revenue of capital when the firm is sales-constrained. This second term is non-negative and
decreasing in kt, increasing in the demand level qdt . The optimality condition (8) thus determines
the optimal capital stock as a function of factor costs and sales orders. It can be written more
concisely as follows6:
kt = K
(
rt + δ
pt
, ωt, q
d
t , θ¯t,Θ
)
, (9)
where Θ summarises the parameters characterising the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks.
Function K is decreasing in rt + δ and increasing in qdt . It depends ambiguously on ωt because
a higher real wage increases the marginal return on capital in the case of a sales constraint and
reduces it in the other case.
In the limit case where θ¯t → θmin, the firm chooses so large a capital stock (relatively to qdt )
that it will always be in a position to serve the demanded quantity7. This case may occur when
the real wage ωt is low enough to compensate the under-utilization of the productive capital
occurring for all θt > θmin. The opposite limit case (θ¯t → θmax) corresponds to a Walrasian
investment behaviour and will be examined below (see section 2.2).
Final Goods Producers
To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the final good production process
uses only intermediate goods. We furthermore assume constant returns to scale and perfect
substitutability between all intermediate goods, that is:
yt =
∫ 1
0
qjt dj , (10)
where yt is the final output level and qjt is the quantity of input j used in production. Perfect
competition between intermediate good producers implies a unique price pjt = pt, ∀ j. With the
production technology (10), the intermediate goods market equilibrium condition will further
imply that pt be equal to the price of the final good8, i.e., pt = 1. Whatever its output level,
6Note that the optimal value of the capital stock is determined even in the constant returns-to-scale case,
provided the probability of a sales-constraint is strictly positive.
7In the limit case where θmin = 0, this would of course imply that q
d
t → 0.
8Assuming decreasing returns would break the equality between the intermediate and final good prices but
would not change our results qualitatively.
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a final firm will make zero profits and will accept to serve any final demand level. For a firm
using (10), the total demand for intermediate goods is thus equal to its output level yt.
As said before, we assume that the final goods firm sends the same purchase order qdt to every
intermediate goods producer, without knowing each individual producer’s productivity level9.
For every intermediate good, there is now a positive probability (equal to Pr(θt < θ¯t)) that the
supply will fall short of the ordered quantity qdt . This possibility is taken into account by the
final firm when formulating its input demands. Because inputs are perfectly substitutable, the
final firm will order a quantity qdt of each input such that the total amount qt eventually received
and defined by
qt =
∫ θ¯t
θmin
q(kt, ωt, θ) dG(θ) +
[
1−G(θ¯t)
]
qdt
satisfies the production constraint yt = qt. This gives qdt as a function of yt, θ¯t and q(kt, ωt, θ):
qdt =
yt −
∫ θ¯t
θmin
q(kt, ωt, θ) dG(θ)
1−G(θ¯t)
. (11)
Consumers
A representative infinitely-lived agent consumes, supplies labour, accumulates productive capital
and lends it to input firms. Her total revenue coincides with the total gross domestic income:
wage and interest rate income, plus the firms’ profits10.
Let us denote ct the consumption spending in t, nt the labour supply in t and kt+1 the stock of
capital accumulated by the consumer at the end of period t. Her optimisation programme can
then be written as follows:
max
{ct,nt}t≥1
∞∑
t=1
u(ct)− v(nt)
(1 + ρ)t
,
subject to: kt+1 + ct = (1 + rt) kt +Dt + wt nt, ∀ t ≥ 1 ,
and: lim
t→∞R1,t+1 kt+1 ≥ 0 , k1 given,
9In a centralized or a Walrasian market, the allocation of this total demand across intermediate firms would
coincide with the Walrasian output levels of those firms.
10As the technological shocks experienced by input firms are purely idiosyncratic, they do not induce any
uncertainty for the representative household (or for any household who has diversified perfectly her portfolio
choice). For her, there is thus no market incompleteness.
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where ρ > 0 and R1,t+1 is the discount factor associated to period t+1 (R1,t+1 = Πt+1s=2 (1+rs)
−1)
and Dt stands for the total amount of dividends distributed by intermediate firms:
Dt = pt
[∫ θ¯t
θmin
Πw (kt, ωt, θ) dG(θ) +
∫ θmax
θ¯t
Πd
(
kt, q
d
t , ωt, θ
)
dG(θ) − (rt + δ) kt
]
. (12)
Functions u(·) and v(·) are assumed to be such that: u′(·), v′(·) > 0, u′′()˙ < 0 and v′′(·) > 0.
The representative consumer’s optimal consumption path and labour supply satisfy the usual
first-order conditions: ∀ t ≥ 1,
u′(ct) =
(1 + rt+1)
1 + ρ
u′(ct+1) or ct = c(ct+1, rt+1), (13)
v′(nt) = u′(ct)wt or nt = n(wt, ct), (14)
where given our assumptions on functions u and v, function c is increasing in ct+1 and decreasing
in rt+1 and function n is increasing in wt and decreasing in ct.
2.2 General Equilibrium
The market equilibrium conditions are defined as follows.
On the intermediate goods markets, pt is equal to 1 (hence ωt = wt) and an intermediate firm
for which θ ≤ θ¯t (resp. θ > θ¯t) produces q(kt, ωt, θt) (resp. qdt ), where θ¯t and qdt are determined
by (6) and (11) respectively.
On the final good market, the final good supply is equal to the consumption and investment
demands, i.e.,
yt =
∫ θ¯t
θmin
q(kt, ωt, θ) dG(θ) +
[
1−G(θ¯t)
]
qdt = ct +∆kt+1 + δ kt, (15)
where ct satisfies the consumer’s optimality conditions.
On the capital market, the demand for capital (9) is equal to the capital stock accumulated by
the households:
K(rt + δ, ωt, qdt , θ¯t,Θ) = kt. (16)
Finally, the labour market equilibrium condition implies that labour demand be equal to the
total workforce nt:
nt =
∫ θ¯t
θmin
`(kt, ωt, θt) dG(θ) +
∫ θmax
θ¯t
`d(kt, qdt , θt) dG(θ) . (17)
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An intertemporal general equilibrium of this economy is defined by a sequence of vectors of
prices (pt, rt, ωt)t≥1 and quantities
(
qdt , yt, ct, nt, kt+1
)
t≥1 and of values of θ¯t such that, at given
predetermined capital stock kt, the following conditions are satisfied:
• consumers, intermediate and final goods producers behave optimally (see equations (13),
(14), (4) and (8), (11) respectively) ;
• on the intermediate goods markets, a proportion G(θ¯t) of firms experiences a productivity
shock smaller than or equal to θ¯t (defined by (6)) and produces q(kt, ωt, θt); a proportion
of firms
[
1−G(θ¯t)
]
experiences a higher productivity shock and produces qdt ;
• there is competitive equilibrium on all the other markets (labour, capital, final goods).
Proposition 1
1. If G(θ) is a degenerate distribution (no microeconomic uncertainty), the equilibrium is
unique and coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium without heterogeneity between inter-
mediate firms.
2. If G(θ) is a non-degenerate distribution, there is a continuum of equilibria, which can be
indexed by intermediate firms’ sales expectations.
3. If G(θ) is a non-degenerate distribution, a Walrasian equilibrium with heterogeneous in-
termediate firms can be obtained provided sales expectations are sufficiently optimistic.
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Proof
1. If the distribution G(θ) is degenerate, one has θmin = θmax. qdt is then necessarily equal to
the Walrasian output level qwt (see e.g. (6)), which takes the same value for all intermediate
goods producers. Equations (13) to (17) then define a standard Walrasian equilibrium.
2. In the general case where 0 ≤ θmin < θmax < ∞, at given expectations on ct+1 and rt+1,
there are only six equations to determine the seven unknowns (rt, ωt, θ¯t, qdt , yt, nt, kt+1).
Otherwise stated there is a vector of factor prices (rt, ωt) and a vector of quantities
(yt, qdt , nt, kt+1) satisfying the equilibrium conditions (6), (11), (14), (15), (16), (17) for
each possible value of θ¯t between θmin and θmax. This is true for every period t. Ob-
viously enough, the interval of equilibrium values of each of the endogenous variables
(rt, ωt, qdt , yt, nt, kt+1) is larger, the larger the interval of admissible values for θ¯t, i.e., the
larger the measure of [θmin, θmax].
One can easily check that the stationary equilibrium is also indeterminate.
3. In the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, the Walrasian equilibrium can be thought as
coming from a centralized trading process on the intermediate goods market. It would
then be possible to achieve ex post a perfect match between demands and supplies11. Each
intermediate firm would then produce and sell its Walrasian output level q(kt, ωt, θ) and
aggregate output would be uniquely determined by:
ywt =
∫ θmax
θmin
q(kwt , ω
w
t , θ) dG(θ) (18)
with a Walrasian wage rate satisfying:
n(ωwt , ct) =
∫ θmax
θmin
`(kwt , ω
w
t , θ) dG(θ) (19)
and a demand for capital kwt such that:
rt + δ =
∫ θmax
θmin
Πwk (k
w
t , ω
w
t , θ) dG(θ). (20)
11Equivalently, we could assume that the final good firm has perfect information about the profitable productive
capacity of each individual intermediate goods producer. Input orders would then be adjusted in such a way that
qdj ≡ qwj , ∀ j.
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The same equilibrium values are also obtained in our setup provided sales expectations
are sufficiently optimistic to imply θ¯t ≥ θmax.
QED
The idiosyncratic shocks introduced in point 2 of proposition 1 imply heterogeneous employment
and production decisions at the prevailing competitive prices and wages. In a Walrasian world,
those shocks would be inconsequential at the aggregate economy level: ex post, final firms
would always buy from each intermediate firm a quantity of intermediate goods equal to its
optimal production level. We have departed from this Walrasian scenario by considering the case
where final firms send purchase orders to intermediate firms without knowing every intermediate
firm’s optimal production level. At the competitive price, an intermediate firm enjoying a good
productivity shock may then receive too few purchase orders, and vice-versa. The possibility of
such outcomes makes the intermediate firm’s investment choice depend on expected forthcoming
purchase orders. It is these expectation effects that induce indeterminacy of the macroeconomic
equilibrium: pessimistic sales expectations reduce the demand for capital, which leads to a lower
rental price of capital on the one hand and to a lower labour demand and lower wages on the
other hand. Both evolutions lower the domestic income, low activity levels following from low
investments due to pessimistic expectations.
Points 1 and 3 of Proposition 1 show that the market organization we assumed here is not per
se incompatible with the realization of the Walrasian equilibrium. On the one hand (point 1),
this market organization leads to the unique Walrasian equilibrium in the limit case where there
are no microeconomic shocks: agents then possess all the relevant information and decentralised
trading raises no coordination difficulty. On the other hand (point 3), when there is uncertainty
and therefore imperfect information between agents, the same market organization is able to
reproduce the Walrasian equilibrium provided that agents be optimistic enough.
2.3 An Example
To gain further insights into the properties of the non-Walrasian economy described so far,
let us assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with non-increasing returns to scale. More
12
specifically, we assume:
qt = θt `αt k
β
t , with α+ β ≤ 1 . (21)
The detailed expressions corresponding to equations (2) and (4) are given in Appendix 1.
The capital demand equation (8) becomes:
rt + δ
β
=
(wt
α
)−α/(1−α)
k
− 1−α−β
1−α
t h(θ¯t,Θ) , (22)
where h(θ¯t,Θ) =
{∫ θ¯t
θmin
θ
1
1−α dG(θ) +
(
θ¯t
) 1
α(1−α)
∫ θmax
θ¯t
θ−1/α dG(θ)
}
, (23)
and θ¯t =
(wt
α
)α (
qdt
)1−α
k−βt . (24)
Because all intermediate goods producers face ex ante the same decision problem and the ag-
gregate capital stock is predetermined, (22) is also the capital market equilibrium condition.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the labor market equilibrium condition (17) similarly become:
nt =
(wt
α
)−1/(1−α)
k
β/(1−α)
t h(θ¯t,Θ) , (25)
where h(θ¯t,Θ) and θ¯t keep the same definition as in (23) and (24).
The final output supply is given by
yt =
(wt
α
)−α/(1−α)
k
β/(1−α)
t H(θ¯t,Θ) (26)
where H(θ¯t,Θ) =
{∫ θ¯t
θmin
θ
1
1−α dG(θ) +
(
θ¯t
) 1
1−α
∫ θmax
θ¯t
dG(θ)
}
, (27)
Let us further assume that the consumers’ preferences are described by isoelastic functions:
u(ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ with σ ≥ 0 (28)
v(nt) = m
n1+ηt
1 + η
with η ≥ 0,m ≥ 0 (29)
The labour supply function nt is then described by
nt =
(
c−σt wt
m
)1/η
(30)
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Lemma 1
Functions h(θ¯t,Θ) and H(θ¯t,Θ) are increasing in θ¯t and such that
h(θ¯t,Θ) < H(θ¯t,Θ), ∀ θ¯t < θmax and
0 ≤ h(θmin,Θ) < H(θmin,Θ) ≤ h(θmax,Θ) = H(θmax,Θ)
Hence, h(θmin,Θ)/h(θmax,Θ) < 1; moreover,
H(θmin,Θ)
h(θmin,Θ)
>
H(θmax,Θ)
h(θmax,Θ)
= 1
Proof
The first-partial derivatives of h(θ¯t,Θ) and H(θ¯t,Θ) with respect to θ¯t are respectively:
∂h(θ¯t,Θ)
∂θ¯t
=
1
α(1− α)
(
θ¯t
) 1
α(1−α)−1
∫ θmax
θ¯t
(
1
θ
)1/α
dG(θ) ≥ 0;
∂H(θ¯t,Θ)
∂θ¯t
=
1
(1− α)
(
θ¯t
) α
1−α
∫ θmax
θ¯t
dG(θ) ≥ 0
h(θ¯t,Θ) and H(θ¯t,Θ) differ only in their second term, the value of which is smaller in h(θ¯t,Θ)
than in H(θ¯t,Θ). Indeed,(
θ¯t
) 1
α(1−α)
∫ θmax
θ¯t
θ−1/α dG(θ) =
(
θ¯t
) 1
1−α
∫ θmax
θ¯t
(
θ
θ¯t
)−1/α
<
(
θ¯t
) 1
1−α
∫ θmax
θ¯t
dG(θ)
since (
θ
θ¯t
)−1/α
=
(
θ¯t
θ
)1/α
< 1, ∀ θ > θ¯t
The other results are obvious.
QED
With a Cobb-Douglas production, the aggregate capital/labour ratio (given by the ratio of
equations (22) and (25) only depends on relative factor prices:
kt
nt
=
wt/α
(rt + δ)/β
. (31)
The ratio of equations (26) and (22) and the ratio of equations (26) and (25) give the output-
capital and output-labour ratios respectively:
yt
kt
=
rt + δ
β
H(θ¯t,Θ)
h(θ¯t,Θ)
(32)
yt
nt
=
wt
α
H(θ¯t,Θ)
h(θ¯t,Θ)
(33)
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Let us denote by xss the stationary state value of variable x. In a stationary state, the first
order condition on consumption determined the real rate of interest rss = ρ and consumption is
given by the net output level, i.e.,
css = yss − δkss = kss g(θ¯ss,Θ) (34)
where g(θ¯ss,Θ) is the stationary consumption-capital ratio given (using (32)) by
g(θ¯ss,Θ) =
ρ+ δ
β
H(θ¯ss,Θ)
h(θ¯ss,Θ)
− δ. (35)
Inserting (30) into the stationary state expression of (25) and substituting the stationary state
consumption by (34) allow ones to express the stationary state wage rate as a function of the
capital stock and θ¯ss. By using this stationary equilibrium relationship to eliminate the wage
rate into (22), one can then write the stationary state value of the capital stock as an increasing
function of θ¯ss:
kss =
( α
m
)φm (ρ+ δ
β
)φk
I(θ¯ss,Θ) (36)
where
I(θ¯ss,Θ) =
(
g(θ¯ss,Θ)
)φg (h(θ¯ss,Θ))φh
with
φm =
α
(1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ)
φk = − 1 + η − α(1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ) < 0
φg = − ασ(1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ) < 0
φh =
(1 + η)(1− α)
(1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ) > 0
Proposition 2
a) The set of all possible stationary state values of the capital stock kss is defined
by the following interval:
I(θmin,Θ)
I(θmax,Θ)
kwss ≤ kss ≤ kwss , (37)
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where kwss is the stationary state value of the capital stock at the Walrasian equilib-
rium obtained from (36) with θ¯ss = θmax
kwss =
( α
m
)φm (ρ+ δ
β
)φk
I(θmax,Θ)
where I(θmax,Θ) =
(
ρ+ δ
β
− δ
)φg (∫ θmax
θmin
θ1/(1−α) dG(θ))
)φh
.
(37) and the other equations can be combined to obtain the equilibrium interval for
the real wage, output and employment.
b) The interval of indeterminacy is increasing in the wage-elasticity of the labour
supply 1/η.
c) The interval of indeterminacy depends ambiguously on the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption, 1/σ.
Proof
a) follows directly from the ratio of the expressions of kss in (36) respectively for θ¯ss = θmax and
θ¯ss = θmin.
Note in particular that
I(θmin,Θ)
I(θmax,Θ)
=
(
g(θmin,Θ)
g(θmax,Θ)
)φg (h(θmin,Θ)
h(θmax,Θ)
)φh
< 1. (38)
Indeed, the ratio between h(θmin,Θ) and h(θmax,Θ) is smaller than one (see lemma 1) and raised
to a positive power. Moreover, lemma 1 implies that g(θmin,Θ) > g(θmax,Θ): the ratio between
g(θmin,Θ) and g(θmax,Θ) is thus larger than 1 but raised to a negative power. Hence, (38) is
the product of two terms smaller than 1.
b) Obviously enough, the smaller the ratio between I(θmin,Θ) and I(θmax,Θ), the larger the
interval of indeterminacy. Let us show that (38) is increasing in η so that the interval of
indeterminacy is decreasing in η (or increasing in 1/η):
∂
∂η
(
I(θmin,Θ)
I(θmax,Θ)
)
=
I(θmin,Θ)
I(θmax,Θ)
[(
ln
g(θmin,Θ)
g(θmax,Θ)
)
∂φg
∂η
+
(
ln
h(θmin,Θ)
h(θmax,Θ)
)
∂φh
∂η
]
,
which is unambiguously positive since lemma 1 implies the positivity of the first log (see 35)
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and the negativity of the second one and
∂φg
∂η
=
α(1− β)σ
((1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ))2 > 0
∂φh
∂η
= − α(1− α)(1− σ)
((1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ))2 < 0.
c) The first derivative of (38) with respect to σ is equal to
∂
∂σ
(
I(θmin,Θ)
I(θmax,Θ)
)
=
I(θmin,Θ)
I(θmax,Θ)
[(
ln
g(θmin,Θ)
g(θmax,Θ)
)
∂φg
∂σ
+
(
ln
h(θmin,Θ)
h(θmax,Θ)
)
∂φh
∂σ
]
,
which has an ambiguous sign because the two logs have opposite signs whereas both partial
derivatives are negative:
∂φg
∂σ
= −α 1− α− β + η(1− β)
((1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ))2 < 0
∂φh
∂σ
= − α(1− α)(1 + η)
((1 + η)(1− β)− α(1− σ))2 < 0.
QED
Proposition 2 shows the determinants of the interval of indeterminacy in the particular case of
an economy with a Cobb-Douglas technology and isoelastic utility functions. Proposition 2.b is
quite intuitive. In the model economy, a wave of optimism/pessimism shifts capital and labour
demands upwards/downwards. The flatter the labour supply curve (the larger 1/η), the less a
given labour demand shift will affect wages and the more it will affect employment (and thereby
capital demand and output). It is worth noting that indeterminacy remains even in the extreme
case of an inelastic labour supply (η →∞): in such a case indeed,
I(θmin,Θ)
I(θmax,Θ)
=
(
h(θmin,Θ)
h(θmax,Θ)
) 1−α
1−β
< 1.
Employment is then exogenously determined but there is still room for indeterminacy in wages,
capital, output and consumption.
Proposition 2.c about the ambiguous impact of 1/σ is intuitive as well. At given wage, a wave
of optimism that increases the labour demand also reduces the labour supply (since consump-
tion increases and leisure is a normal good). Obviously enough, the larger the labour supply
contraction at given wage, the smaller the quantitative impact of a labour demand increase: the
labour supply shift thus dampens the employment/output fluctuations following from a wave of
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optimism/pessimism. But the size of the labour supply shift depends ambiguously on σ. On
the one hand for a given increase in consumption, a larger σ implies a larger labour supply
shift at given wage. On the other hand, the increase in consumption itself depends negatively
on σ: the larger σ (the smaller 1/σ), the more consumers will choose to smooth consumption
intertemporally and the less consumption will increase.
3 Demand Shocks and Business Cycle Fluctuations
The model developed in the previous sections implies that pure demand expectation shocks
can have real effects. Our objective in this section is to calibrate a model and use numerical
simulations to examine the characteristics of the propagation mechanism associated to such
stochastic demand shocks. We compare these characteristics to those of a typical RBC model,
where fluctuations are triggered by technological shocks, and to those of a model where “animal
spirit” effects arise from the multiplicity of equilibrium trajectories around a deterministic steady
state (i.e. the steady state is a sink).
Two ways of introducing demand expectations effects
The dynamics of an intertemporal general equilibrium model with rational expectations can be
illustrated by the following linearized system borrowed from Benhabib-Farmer (1999):
cˆt+1
kˆt+1
sˆt+1
 = Ψ

cˆt
kˆt
sˆt
 + Γ
et+1
ut+1
 (39)
A hat over a variable indicates the percentage deviation from the steady state value; c is a control
variable (typically consumption) while k and s are two state variables, typically the capital stock
and total factor productivity (the Solow residual). e and u represent unanticipated changes
(innovations) in c and s. In standard RBC models, matrix Ψ has as many unstable (resp. stable)
roots as there are control (resp. state) variables. The model then satisfies the Blanchard-Kahn
conditions and has a unique rational expectation equilibrium trajectory, obtained by eliminating
the influence of the unstable root. In such a case the control variable is solely a function of the
state variables k and s. In other words, expectational errors on consumption are solely a function
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of the innovations u; there is no room for independent demand expectations effects e. A variety
of model though have been constructed where the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are violated. The
unique steady state equilibrium is then a sink, which leaves a role for pure demand expectation
effects like e (see the survey in Benhabib-Farmer (1999)).
The demand expectation effect appearing in the non-Walrasian model of the previous section
is of a different nature. There is one extra state variable (sales orders qd), whose effect can be
represented in the above dynamic system in a way similar to that of the technology shock s
and the associated innovation term u. Around any stationary equilibrium corresponding to a
given steady state value qd, stochastic demand fluctuations will generate output fluctuations via
their impact on firms and households behaviors. In other words, we obtain demand expectation
effects even though the model satisfies the Blanchard-Kahn conditions.
In a case with centralized trading, our model boils down to a standard RBC model with Wal-
rasian properties and no demand expectation effects. We will use numerical simulations to
compare a non-Walrasian and a Walrasian version of the model, the former with aggregate
demand shocks, the latter with aggregate productivity shocks.
Model specification and calibration
We extend our model in order to introduce the possibility of aggregate technological shocks and
endogenise labour supply decisions. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, which is
an obvious generalization of (21):
qt = At θt (Xt `t)
α k1−αt , with Xt = γ Xt−1 , γ > 1. (40)
Aggregate productivity is made of two components, a deterministic component Xt assumed to
grow at constant rate, and a random component At determined by the following autoregressive
stochastic process:
At =
(
A¯
)1−µu (At−1)µu eut where ut ∼ N(0, σ2u). (41)
The idiosyncratic productivity shock θt is assumed to be distributed uniformly over an interval
[θmin, θmax] centered around one and such that there can be a 40% difference between the most
and the least productive firms.
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Consumers’ preferences with respect to consumption and labour are described by the isoelastic
functions (28) and (29).
For the Walrasian version of the model, we use the same parameter values as in the baseline
model of King-Rebelo (1999), except for the disutility of work, where we use the indivisibility
assumption of Hansen (1985) and set η = 0 (instead of −1). The parameter values used to
simulate the model are reproduced in table 1. In the non-Walrasian version of the model, the
stochastic demand shock is assumed to follow the autoregressive process:
qdt =
(
q¯ d
)1−µv (
qdt−1
)µv
evt where vt ∼ N(0, σ2v) . (42)
A distinctive feature of the non-Walrasian model is its direct implications in terms of capacity
utilization. The macroeconomic rate of capacity utilization can be defined as the ratio between
the observed and the Walrasian output levels, at given output and factor prices, i.e.,
dt =
yt
ywt
,
with ywt given by (18). We choose to set q¯
d at 0.80, so as to obtain an aggregate rate of capacity
utilization equal to d = 0.92 at steady state. The parameters determining the volatility and the
persistence of the demand shocks are given the same values as those of the productivity shocks
in the Walrasian model (that is µv = µu and σv = σu).12 The models are simulated under the
assumption of an exogenous deterministic growth of 0.4% on a quarterly basis.
σ ρ−1 − 1 m η γ α δ µu σu q¯ d θ¯min θ¯max
1 0.984 3.48 0 1.004 0.667 0.025 0.979 0.0072 0.80 0.80 1.20
Table 1: Calibration
Simulation results
The simulation results are summarized in table 2. All variables have been logged and detrended
with the HP filter. The first part of the table gives the standard deviations of the main variables
12A sensitivity analysis (see Appendix 4) makes clear that the simulation results reported in table 2 (column
b) do not depend importantly on the calibration we chose for the demand shock.
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relative to that of output; the second part of the table gives the contemporaneous correlations
with output. Column (a) reproduces the business cycle characteristics of US data reported in
King-Rebelo (1999). The second-order moments generated with our non-Walrasian model and
demand shocks are given in column (b). For comparison, we reproduce in columns (c) the values
obtained with the Walrasian version of our model and aggregate productivity shocks. Except
for idiosyncratic shocks, this version of our model corresponds to a basic RBC model. Column
(d) gives the simulation results obtained without these idiosyncratic productivity shocks (i.e.
with θmin = θmax = 1). Except for the intertemporal elasticity of leisure (η = 0 instead of
-1), the model of column (d) is identical to the baseline RBC model of King-Rebelo (1999).
The last column reproduces the results obtained by Farmer-Guo (1994). In the latter model,
demand expectations can also have real effects, albeit by a quite different channel than in our
non-Walrasian setup. Demand expectation effects in Farmer-Guo (FG hereafter) arise from the
multiplicity of admissible equilibrium trajectories (around a unique steady state) generated by
the increasing returns to scale assumption, while in our non-Walrasian setup there is a continuum
of steady state equilibria but a unique equilibrium trajectory associated to a given steady state.
In order to ease the comparisons between columns (b) and (c), we display and comment in
Appendix 3 figures comparing the impulse response functions of our model in the cases of
aggregate productivity and demand shocks.
Comparing columns (c) and (d) shows that idiosyncratic shocks do not change the cyclical prop-
erties of the Walrasian economy in reaction to productivity shocks. In a non-Walrasian setup
they imply however that pure demand shocks can generate cyclical properties not too far from
those observed in the data (see columns (a) and (b)). A positive demand shock increases invest-
ment demand, which stimulates production (and employment) in all firms with idle profitable
capacities. At the same time, a higher investment demand raises the real interest rates, which
dampens partially the increase in consumption demand following from the income expansion.
The higher labour demand leads to a procyclical increase in real wages. With the chosen cali-
bration, investment and employment are more volatile and more correlated with output in the
non-Walrasian model than in the standard RBC model, while consumption and wages are made
less volatile and less correlated with output. It is worth noting that the same comments apply
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US data Non-Walrasian Walrasian Walrasian* FG (94)
(demand shocks) (RBC+idios. sh.) (basic RBC)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Relative standard deviation
y 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
c 0.74 0.26 0.43 0.43 0.24
i 2.93 4.38 3.30 3.30 5.13
` 0.99 1.39 0.61 0.62 0.83
w 0.38 0.26 0.43 0.43 0.24
d > 1 1.22 - - -
Contemporaneous correlation with output
y 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
c 0.88 0.56 0.93 0.93 0.78
i 0.80 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
` 0.88 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.98
w 0.12 0.56 0.93 0.93 0.78
d > 0 1.00 - - -
* King-Rebelo (1999)’s baseline model with labor indivisibility a` la Hansen (1985)
Table 2: Business cycle statistics
to the comparison between the Farmer-Guo model with demand shocks and the standard RBC
model, with the non-Walrasian model being perhaps somewhat closer to the data.
The non-Walrasian model with pure demand shocks thus appears to be capable of generating
interesting business cycle characteristics. It certainly performs as well as the RBC model or
the Farmer-Guo model with increasing returns. Because its main propagation mechanism works
through capacity utilization changes, it furthermore implies a strongly volatile and procyclical
capacity utilization rate, as suggested by available empirical evidence. The literature on RBC
models (a.o. Burnside et al. (1996), Fagnart et al. (1998)) has already stressed that capital
utilization changes can be a strong propagation and amplification mechanism of aggregate tech-
22
nological shocks. Capacity utilisation may similarly amplify the effects of pure demand shocks.
The real effects of a given demand shock will be larger the lower the initial value of the economy’s
capacity utilization rate. As figure 1 shows, the sensitivity of output to demand shocks depends
on the macroeconomic rate of capacity utilization (d): the lower d, the larger the volatility of
output relative to that of the demand shock. For a given distribution of shocks, the relative
volatility of output is multiplied by almost 2 when capacity utilization decreases from (almost)
100% to 80%.
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Figure 1: Aggregate capacity utilization and relative output volatility
4 Conclusions
The main result of the paper can be summarized as follows: in an economy where on some mar-
kets firms produce and sell on orders, genuine demand expectations effects (in the investment
decisions of those firms) may appear and create equilibrium indeterminacy if firms are imper-
fectly informed about their trading opportunities when investing. Our indeterminacy result is
thus rooted in the very working of a decentralized market in the absence of a market institu-
tion reproducing the coordinating activity of the Walrasian auctioneer. It does not rely on the
existence of externalities, technological complementarities or increasing returns to scale as is
the case in many other business cycle models with indeterminacy. A quantitative exploration
of the implications of our model shows that it is consistent with an alternative interpretation
of business cycle fluctuations, driven by self-fulfilling demand shocks instead of technological
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shocks.
We want to stress that the market organization we assumed here is not per se incompatible with
the realization of the Walrasian equilibrium. On the one hand, this market organization leads
to the unique Walrasian equilibrium in the limit case where there are no microeconomic shocks:
agents then possess all the relevant information and decentralised trading raises no coordination
difficulty. On the other hand, when there is uncertainty (and therefore imperfect information
between agents), the same market organization is able to reproduce the Walrasian equilibrium
provided that agents be optimistic enough.
The model developed in this paper is admittedly a very stylised one. From a theoretical point
of view, the representation of the information problem between agents should clearly be refined.
From an empirical point of view, various extensions like a more realistic description of the
labour market would be necessary to reproduce more precisely the cyclical properties of actual
economies.
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Appendix 1: Firms’ behaviour with Cobb Douglas technologies
Assume the Cobb Douglas technology qt = θt `αt k
β
t , α+ β ≤ 1.
The employment and production decisions corresponding to a Walrasian behaviour are
`wt = `(kt, ωt, θt) =
[
α θ
ωt
kβt
] 1
1−α
and qwt = q(kt, ωt, θt) = θt
[
α θt
ωt
k
β/α
t
] α
1−α
(43)
Πwt then becomes
Πw(kt, ωt, θt) = (1− α) qwt (44)
with
Πwk (kt, ωt, θt) = β θ
1/(1−α)
t
(
α
ωt
)α/(1−α)
k
− 1−α−β
1−α
t (45)
In the case of a sales contraint, one has
`dt = `
d(kt, qdt , θt) =
[
qdt
θt
]1/α
(kt)
−β/α (46)
Πd(kt, qdt , ωt, θt) = q
d
t − ωt`dt (47)
and
Πdk(kt, q
d
t , ωt, θt) = −ωt
∂`dt
∂kt
=
β
α
ωt
[
qdt
θt
]1/α
(kt)
−(α+β)/α
A firm then installs a capital stock level kt given by the first order optimality condition given
in the main text (see (22)).
Appendix 2: Alternative modelling with idiosyncratic demand shock
This appendix presents an alternative version of our model where uncertainty follows from id-
iosyncratic demand shock instead of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. θt is now a technological
parameter identical to all intermediate firms, which face idiosyncratic demand uncertainty fol-
lowing from the behaviour of the final firms.
More precisely, we assume that there is a mass N of ex ante identical producers of the final
good, with N much larger than 1 (which is the mass of intermediate firms). With a quantity
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qt of intermediate good, a final good firm produces qt units of final good. In order to simplify
the presentation, we assume that a final firm orders its inputs to only one intermediate firm and
that each intermediate firm is initially uncertain about the number of final firms that will be
its customers during a given period: during period t, an intermediate firm receives input orders
from νt final firms, where νt is a random number with distribution function G(ν) defined over
the interval [νmin, νmax] with 0 ≤ νmin < νmax < N and∫ νmax
νmin
ν d G(ν) = N.
Optimal labour demand of intermediate good producers
If each final firm orders an input quantity qdt , an input firm thus receives a global order of q
d
t νt
and produces a quantity given by min(qdt νt, q
w
t ). Variables q
w
t `
w
t , and Π
w
t remain described
by (2) and (3). When the input firm is sales constrained (qt = qdt νt), its labour demand and
operating surplus become
`dt = `
d(kt, qdt νt, θt), (48)
Πdt = ptΠ
d
(
kt, q
d
t νt, ωt, θt
)
where Πd
(
kt, q
d
t νt, ωt, θt
)
= qdt νt − ωt `dt (49)
Let us denote by ν¯t the critical value of the demand shock such that the quantity of orders
received by an intermediate firm matches exactly its Walrasian production plan:
ν¯t =
q(kt, ωt, θt)
qdt
. (50)
An intermediate firm for which νt is smaller (resp. larger) than ν¯t is (resp. is not) sales-
constrained.
Optimal capital stock of intermediate good producers
Expected profits maximization can thus be written as follows:
max
kt
∫ ν¯t
νmin
ptΠd
(
kt, q
d
t ν, ωt, θt
)
dG(ν) +
∫ νmax
ν¯t
ptΠw(kt, ωt, θt) dG(ν) − (rt + δ) kt. (51)
The capital stock kt is determined by the following first-order optimality condition:
rt + δ
pt
=
∫ ν¯t
νmin
Πdk
(
kt, q
d
t ν, ωt, θt
)
dG(ν) +
∫ νmax
ν¯t
Πwk (kt, ωt, θt) dG(ν) , (52)
where function Πwk (resp. Π
d
k) represents the first partial derivative of function Π
w (resp. Πd)
with respect to k. The first term on the right-hand side of (52) is the expected marginal revenue
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of capital when the firm is sales-constrained. This term is non-negative and decreasing in kt,
increasing in the demand level qdt νt. The second term on the right-hand side of (52) represents
the expected marginal revenue of capital when the firm operates at its Walrasian level. Like (8),
the optimality condition (52) thus determines the optimal capital stock as a function of factor
costs and sales orders: more concisely,
kt = K
(
rt + δ
pt
, ωt, q
d
t , ν¯t, Ξ
)
, (53)
where Ξ summarizes the parameters characterising the distribution function of the idiosyncratic
demand shock.
Input demand of a final firm
When νt, the number of final firms which are customers of a given intermediate firm, is smaller
(resp. larger) than ν¯t, the input orders are all fulfilled (resp. are filled up to a quantity qwt ).
In aggregate, the final output supply Qt following from the order of a quantity qdt by each final
firm is thus given by
Qt =
∫ ν¯t
νmin
qdt ν dG(ν) +
∫ νmax
ν¯t
q(kt, ωt, θt) dG(ν). (54)
At the final good market equilibrium, the final output supply Qt must match the final output
demand yt. Final good market clearing thus requires that final firms (which make zero profit at
any final output level) order an input quantity qdt such that
qdt =
yt −
∫ νmax
ν¯t
q(kt, ωt, θt) dG(ν)∫ ν¯t
νmin
ν dG(ν)
. (55)
Consumers
Except for the definition of Dt, the section describing the consumers’s behaviour is identical to
the one of the main text.
General equilibrium
The market equilibrium conditions can be defined as in the main text mutatis mutandis.
On the intermediate goods markets, pt is equal to 1 (hence ωt = wt) and an intermediate firm for
which ν ≥ ν¯t (resp. ν < ν¯t) produces q(kt, ωt, θt) (resp. qdt ν), where ν¯t and qdt are determined
by (50) and (55) respectively.
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On the final good market, the final good supply is equal to the consumption and investment
demands, i.e.,
yt =
∫ ν¯t
νmin
qdt ν dG(ν) + q(kt, ωt, θt) [1−G(ν¯t)] = ct +∆kt+1 + δ kt, (56)
where ct satisfies the consumer’s optimality conditions.
On the capital market, the demand for capital (53) is equal to the capital stock accumulated by
the households:
K
(
rt + δ
pt
, ωt, q
d
t , ν¯t, Ξ
)
= kt. (57)
Finally, the labour market equilibrium condition implies that labour demand be equal to the
total workforce nt:
nt =
∫ ν¯t
νmin
`d(kt, qdt ν, θt) dG(ν) + `(kt, ωt, θt)
∫ νmax
ν¯t
dG(ν) . (58)
An intertemporal general equilibrium of this economy is defined by a sequence of vectors of
prices (pt, rt, ωt)t≥1 and quantities
(
qdt , yt, ct, nt, kt+1
)
t≥1 and of values of ν¯t such that, at given
predetermined capital stock kt, the following conditions are satisfied:
• consumers, intermediate and final goods producers behave optimally (see equations (13),
(14), (48) and (52), (55) respectively) ;
• on the intermediate goods markets, a proportionG(ν¯t) of firms experiences a sales shortage;
a proportion of firms [1−G(ν¯t)] produces qwt ;
• there is competitive equilibrium on all the other markets (labour, capital, final goods).
It is then obvious to see that the model with idiosyncratic demand shocks exhibits the same
type of equilibrium indeterminacy as the model of the main text. If G(ν) is a non-degenerate
distribution, there is a continuum of equilibria. Indeed, with 0 ≤ νmin < νmax < N , at given
expectations on ct+1 and rt+1, there are only six equations to determine the seven unknowns
(rt, ωt, ν¯t, qdt , yt, nt, kt+1). Otherwise stated there is a vector of factor prices (rt, ωt) and a vector
of quantities (yt, qdt , nt, kt+1) satisfying the equilibrium conditions (50), (55), (14), (56), (57),
(58) for each possible value of ν¯t between νmin and νmax.
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Appendix 3: Impulse response functions of a technological and a pure demand
shock
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to productivity vs demand shocks
The figures above display the impulse response functions (IRF) of a productivity and a pure
demand shock (models (c) and (b) respectively). For the sake of comparison, these IRFs have
been constructed by calibrating the size of the two shocks so as to produce the same output
response in the first period. As the first graphic shows, this requires a demand shock larger
than the technological shock because the demand shock only affects the output of the sales
constrained firms whereas the technological shock affects all firms. As explained in the main
text, investment and labour are more volatile in response to a demand shock whereas real wages
(and consumption) are less volatile.
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Appendix 4: Sensitivity analysis
This appendix shows how the standard deviation and the correlation with output of employ-
ment, investment and wages (and thus consumption) are affected by the volatility and the serial
correlation of the demand shocks. The variance of the shock has almost no effet on the simulated
moments. Its persistence reduces slightly the volatility and the cross correlation of employment
and investment; its effect on the volatility and the cross correlation of the real wage (and thus
consumption) is a bit stronger but remains weak.
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Figure 3: Volatility of investment, labour and the real wage as a function of the volatility and
the persistence of the demand shocks
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Figure 4: Output correlation of investment, labour and the real wage as a function of the
volatility and the persistence of the demand shocks
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